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Abstract
The increasing amount and complexity of Cyber security attacks in recent years have made
text analysis and data mining techniques an important factor in discovering features of such
attacks and detecting future security threats. In this paper, we report on the results of a recent
case study that involved the analysis of a community data set collected from five small and
medium companies in Korea. The data set represents Cyber security incidents and response
actions. We investigated in the study the kind of problems concerned with the prediction of
response actions to future incidents from features of past incidents. Our analysis is based
on text mining methods, such as n-gram and bag-of-words, as well as on machine learning
algorithms for the classification of incidents and their response actions. Based on the results
of the study, we also suggest an experience-sharing model, which we use to demonstrate how
companies may share their trained classifiers without the sharing of their individual data sets
in a collaborative environment.
Keywords Cyber security · Security data sets · Data mining · Machine learning · Text
analysis
1 Introduction
The increasing amount and complexity of Cyber security attacks in recent years have brought
data mining techniques into the attention of researchers and experts as an important technique
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in detecting such attacks through the analysis of data and side effects left by malware and
spyware programs and incidents of network and host intrusions. In particular, text analysis
and mining is widely used in many Cyber security areas, such as malware detection and
classification (e.g. [14–16,18,22,24,27,29,33]) and malicious code detection (e.g. [7,30,31]).
The popularity of social media has opened up the doors for text mining and analysis as
important techniques for increasing the knowledge about users’ context, e.g. their location
and time, and combining that knowledge with other attributes related to important events,
topics, emotions and interests [21]. Text mining and analysis has also been used for predicting
links [8] and detecting leaks of confidential data [28], the unintentional sharing of private
health information [17], as well as in classical areas such as digital forensics [12], electronic
communications analysis [36] and Web text analysis [19].
Despite all this popularity, the Cyber security community has remained somehow reluctant
in adopting an open approach to security-related data due to many factors. These include
political factors because of the continuing hesitance on the part of organisations to share data
and technical factors related to the consistency, quality and the lack of consensus on the nature
of variables that should be monitored or the metrics that should be used to quantify the security
data themselves [20]. Nonetheless, in recent times, this trend has started to turn with the arrival
of large and open security data sets and data-sharing platforms backed by the reliability and
reputation of well-established organisations in the area of Cyber security. Examples of these
include VCDB [34], CERT’s Knowledgebase at Carnegie Mellon University [10], SecRepo
[26], CAIDA [9] and others. As a result, we are starting to witness an increasing trend in the
usage of data sets in gaining insight into how Cyber incidents occur and how they should
be defended against. A slightly different approach to the sharing of knowledge is based on
what is known as community data sets, where a pre-set-up federation allows organisations to
share data, knowledge and experience. A good example of such federations is the European
Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO) [1] and the European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA) [2]. Other, more national-level hubs of Cyber security have also been set
up all over the world for the same purposes.
The main goal of this study is to demonstrate that experience can be shared in a community
of organisations based on a model of text analysis, where text classifiers can be used across
organisations to predict future aspects of Cyber incidents. We consider, as a case study, one
community data set that represents Cyber security incidents and response actions collected
from five Korean companies. The data set was obtained from the KAITS Industrial Technol-
ogy Security Hub [3] in Korea. In that regard, the paper has the following contributions:
– First, we demonstrate how Cyber security-related questions can be answered based from
analysing a data set. In our analysis, we focus on questions related to the prediction of
future responses to Cyber incidents from the type of malware or the name of the malicious
code encountered in previous incidents. We demonstrate that this has good accuracy using
standard text classification algorithms.
– We also construct an initial model of how trained instances of the text classifiers can
then be shared across the companies without revealing their local data sets, therefore
lifting the contribution of this paper from a pure technical level (text analysis) to a higher
organisational level (experience sharing).
Our paper is an expanded version of a recent work presented in [27]. We expand on [27] by
providing a more comprehensive related work survey and discussion, as well as providing full
details of the motivating scenario, the data set used in the case study, the analysis model and
the results of the classification process obtained. We give in this paper an initial experience-
sharing model as an approach for future research based on the obtained results.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss other works in the
literature related to this paper. In Sect. 3, we describe the scenario motivating our work and
the underlying data set sample used. In Sect. 4, we outline the research questions and the
text mining model used in predicting the answers to these questions. In Sect. 5, we present
the results of the experiments, and in Sect. 6, we discuss some aspects of these results. In
Sect. 7, we outline a model of how companies in our scenario can share experience through
the sharing of their classifier instances. Finally, in Sect. 8, we conclude the paper and outline
some directions for future research.
2 Related work
The use of text analysis and data mining in detecting vulnerabilities and Cyber security
threats is a research area that has been active for a number of years now, particularly with
the massive proliferation of social media and user content-based applications. Most of this
effort has been focused on the extraction of text in order to build information related to
incidents. We review here a few examples of works that have used text and data analysis for
the detection of malware and malicious code based on a variety of techniques.
Text mining has been used extensively in the area of intrusion detection, e.g. in [5,6,
22,23,31,33,37]. In [5], the authors presented a method based on byte n-gram analysis to
detect malicious code using common n-gram (CNG) analysis, which relies on profiles for
class representation. The results showed that the applied method achieved 100% accuracy
on training data and 98% accuracy in threefold cross-validation. Similarly, the authors in
[31] presented a method to analyse suspicious files using OpCode n-gram patterns, which
are extracted from the files data after dis-assembly for detecting unknown malicious code.
The OpCode n-gram patterns can then be included in anti-virus programs as signatures.
The evaluation of the methodology was performed using a test collection comprising of
more than 30,000 files, in which various settings of OpCode n-gram patterns of various size
representations and eight types of classifiers were evaluated. Evaluation results indicated that
the proposed method achieved levels of accuracy higher than 96%.
In [6], text categorisation was used to learn the characteristics of normal and malicious
user behaviour from data stored in the log files of Web servers, more specifically in the
context of tele-medicine applications where malware programs can undermine user privacy.
In [23], a framework was designed for the detection of intrusions based on system calls
that uses text processing and data mining techniques. Once suspicious, system calls are
textually analysed and then clustered based on the K-means method [25] to determine whether
they fall within the malicious group of calls. The authors in [33] used data mining and
text classification methods to detect security threats by extracting relevant information from
various unstructured log messages, while in [22], the authors presented a text mining-based
anomaly detection (TMAD) model to detect HTTP attacks in network traffic. TMAD is an
anomaly detector that uses n-gram text categorisation and term frequency-inverse document
frequency (TF-IDF) methods.
In addition, the authors in [37] proposed a method to automatically detect malicious code
using the n-gram analysis. The proposed method used selected features based on information
gain. Probabilistic neural networks were used in the process of building and testing the pro-
posed multi-classifier system. The individual classifiers were used to produce classification
evidences, where these evidences were then combined by the Dempster–Shafer combination
rules [13,32] to form the final classification results for new malicious code. Experimental
results showed that the detection engine improved compared to the classification results pro-
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duced by the individual classifiers. Other works have used more general (i.e. non-textual) data
mining methods in the context of malware detection and analysis. For example, in [15], the
authors utilised hooking techniques to trace the dynamic signatures that malware programs
try to hide, in which behaviour records are used for classification training and building a
description model. Machine learning algorithms, such as naïve Bayesian, J48 (decision tree)
and support vector machine, were then used for the classification process. The authors in
[18] proposed a graph-mining method to detect variants of malware using static analysis,
while covering the existing defects. The proposed approach combines static analysis and
graph-mining techniques. In addition, a novel algorithm was proposed, called minimal con-
trast frequent subgraph miner (MCFSM) algorithm, which was used for extracting minimal
discriminative and widely employed malicious behaviour patterns. The proposed method
showed high detection rates and low false-positive rates. Additionally, in [14], an API-based
association mining method was proposed for detecting malware. The criteria for API selec-
tion and the criteria for association rule selection were proposed to reduce the number of rules
and to improve the quality of the rules. A classification method based on multiple association
rules was adopted. The experiments showed that the proposed strategies can significantly
improve the running speed of object-oriented association mining, in which the time cost for
data mining was reduced by 32% and the time cost for classification was reduced by 50%.
Another area that has benefited largely from the application of data mining techniques is
spyware detection and analysis. For example, in [7] a method was proposed for spyware detec-
tion using data mining techniques. The framework used the breadth-first search approach,
which is known to work well for detecting viruses and similar software. Experimental results
showed that the method had an accuracy of 90.5% for detecting spyware.
The authors in [35] proposed an integrated architecture to defend against surveillance
spyware and used features extracted from both static and dynamic analysis. These features
were ranked according to their information gains. In addition, a support vector machine
classifier was created for each client. In order to keep the classifier up to date, a server
collects reports from all clients as well as retrain and redistribute the new classifier instance
to each client. The proposed spyware detection system achieved an overall accuracy rate of
97.9% for known surveillance spyware programs and 96.4% for unknown programs.
Our approach in this paper differs from all of the above works in that it not only demon-
strates the use of text and data mining techniques in the analysis of Cyber security data sets,
but also defines an initial model of how experience derived from analysing the data and
training the classifiers can be shared in a community of organisations and used in future pre-
dictions of Cyber incidents across these organisations. In this respect, our paper contributes
to the technical as well as the organisational dimensions of the problem. We are also more
focused on predicting features of incidents rather than detecting an incident as a whole.
3 Motivating scenario and data set
We describe in this section the scenario motivating our work and the sample data set collected
and analysed in the paper.
3.1 Description of the scenario
The main scenario motivating our work was based on the current operational model of
the KAITS Industrial Technology Security Hub [3] in Korea. The hub is a public-private
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Fig. 1 Experience-sharing scenario across n number of organisations
partnership supported by Korean governmental agencies in order to promote the sharing of
Cyber security knowledge, experience and expertise across small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) and increase their ability in responding to future incidents. In our case, this ability is
interpreted as the ability in predicting attributes about future Cyber security incidents based
on features of existing ones. The scenario is depicted in Fig. 1.
Underlying this scenario is the assumption that each instance of a classifier represents the
experience of the company that owns it. This assumption is based on the fact that the classifier
is trained using the company’s past data, which represent the company’s past experience with
Cyber security incidents. Therefore, as depicted in the figure, the sharing of experience is
simply translated in our case as the sharing of trained classifiers. This sharing can be regulated
through some experience or classifier sharing agreement, which would rely on the predictive
qualities of each instance of the classifier being shared. The scenario brings with it a number
of operational constraints; however, one in particular has an impact on the approach we follow
for the rest of the paper.
Constraint [Each company’s data set is secret to that company]. Companies share their
trained classifier instances but not their internal data sets. Therefore, we cannot assume in
this scenario the existence of an overall hub-level data set consisting of the composition of
the individual internal company data sets, and thus create only a single instance of a classifier.
As a result, the scenario requires that the sample data sets collected be kept isolated from one
another, therefore leading to the creation of different instances of the classification algorithms.
In practical terms, this meant that we had to keep the individual company files separate rather
than combining them in one single master file.
3.2 Description of the data set
The data set represents a sample of Cyber security intrusion events detected in five Korean
SMEs over a period of ten months and collected by the KAITS industrial hub [3]. These
companies are known by the pseudonymsDF,MT,SE,EP and MS. The data for each company
are stored in a separate file, kept separate from the other files. There are 4643 incidents overall
in the data set, and these are distributed as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1 Incidents distribution Company name Total number of incidents
Company 1 (DF) 932
Company 2 (MT) 633
Company 3 (SE) 923
Company 4 (EP) 448
Company 5 (MS) 1707
Each entry in a file (expressed as a row) has the following metadata:
– Date and Time of Occurrence: this is a date/time value representing the date
and time of the incident’s occurrence.
– End Device: this is a textual (string) value representing the name of the end device
affected in the incident.
– Malicious Code: this is a textual (string) value representing the name of the mali-
cious code detected in the incident.
– Response: this is a textual (string) value representing the response action that was
applied to the malicious code.
– Type of Malware: this is a textual (string) value representing the type of the malware
(malicious code) detected in the incident.
– Detail: this is a textual (string) value to freely describe any other detail about the
incident (example the location in the computer where the malware resided).
The following is an example entry from one of the files in the data set:
(14/02/2017 11:58, rc0208-pc, Gen:Variant.Mikey.57034, delet
ed, virus, C:\Users\RC0208\AppData\Local\Temp\is-ANFS3.tmp\
SetupG.exe)
4 Research questions andmethodology
Our research in this paper is aimed at investigating one class of problems, where we take a
text classification approach to solving them. This class of problems attempts to predict future
aspects of Cyber security incidents. More specifically, we are concerned with questions
related to how organisations can gain the ability to predict response actions to future Cyber
security incidents involving malware. We consider the following two questions:
Q1. How to predict a response action from the name of malicious code
Q2. How to predict a response action from the type of malware involved
The significance of questions like these is that they can help in planning the level of resources
that an organisation needs to allocate in response to future incidents in an efficient manner, as
well as to take further actions to limit the spread of malware and to maintain the organisation’s
business continuity. We note that the three metadata elements of the data set relevant to the
above two questions that will be used in the classification process are Malicious Code,
Response and Type of Malware. We will discuss later the classes we extracted for
each one of these metadata.
Our proposed model consists of the following two main phases: (1) analysis and (2)
classification. This model is illustrated in Fig. 2. The purpose of creating the model was to
prepare the data for features selection and classification.
We next discuss the two phases of this model.
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Fig. 2 Our analysis and classification Model
(1) The analysis phase is divided into two sub-phases: pre-processing and features extraction.
These are defined as follows:
Pre-processing: This phase is mainly responsible for text pre-processing as some of the
data entries in the data set consist of textual values (e.g. Detail, Malware Detection). The
main objective of pre-processing is to clean the data from noise in order to improve the
accuracy of the results by reducing the errors in the data. This is done by removing special
characters and stop words such as “a” and “the”, punctuation marks such as question and
exclamation marks, and numbers. In addition, all terms are converted to lowercase. The
resulting terms are used to generate the n-gram features. For example, in the Response
data entries, the following has been given as an entry “The file is a malware and has been
blocked”, and after pre-processing, the following information is extracted “file malware
blocked”.
Features extraction: In this phase, features are extracted from the three main classes in the
data set (i.e. Malicious Code, Response and Type of Malware). The most
commonly used features in text mining are n-gram and bag-of-words. The model makes
use of “bigrams”, which are n-grams where n=2. For example, each two adjacent words
create a bigram such as “malware detection”. In this phase, a bag-of-words is created,
which contains all words (bigrams) and features are created from the three metadata
elements above. This bag-of-words is filtered based on the minimum term frequency
method, where terms that occur in less than the minimum frequency are filtered out and
not used as features. For example, in the Response data entries, after the pre-processing
phase, the following information is extracted, “file malware blocked”. However, since
terms that occur in less than the minimum frequency are filtered out and not used as
features, the following features are then extracted from the above information, “malware,
blocked”.
(2) The classification phase makes use of four machine learning algorithms, which are J48
decision tree, support vector machine (SVM), naïve Bayes (NB) and random forest (RF)
algorithms, in order to build, test and compare the n-gram features predictive models.
Each company’s data set is split into training and test sub-data sets. The training data set
is used for building the model, and the test data set is used to evaluate the performance
of the model. Hence, the features that have been extracted are used in the classification
process.
To assess the performance of the machine learning classifiers, KNIME [4] was used. The
experiments were set up using the typical tenfold cross-validation, i.e. the data set is split
into tenfold, and each fold is used, in turn, for testing, while the other 9 are used for training.
The output of the training process is a model, which is then used for the classification in
the test fold. The labels produced by the model are matched to the true labels and typical
performance indicators, such as accuracy, precision, recall and the F-measure [11].
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Table 2 Performance of the
classifiers for identifying the
types of response based on
malicious code—best results are
highlighted in bold
Company name J48 (%) SVM (%) RF (%) NB (%)
Company 1 (DF) 83 87 82 84
Company 2 (MT) 86 87 87 85
Company 3 (SE) 89 89 89 85
Company 4 (EP) 86 91 84 87
Company 5 (MS) 93 93 93 89
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of the application of each of the four machine learning
algorithms to each of the five companies data sets, in order to predict the outcome of the
questions we posed in the previous section. For brevity, we show only the accuracy results
for each case presented as percentage values. More detailed results can be found in Appendix
at the end of the paper.
5.1 Q1 Results
Table 2 presents the classification performance results of the J48, NB, RF and SVM classifiers
for the five companies for the question “How to predict a response action from the name of
malicious code”. Full details can be found in Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in Appendix.
For Company 1 (DF), SVM demonstrated the highest classification accuracy with 87%,
whereas RF was the lowest with 82% accuracy. J48 and NB classifiers had a low recall
value for “deleted” responses. More specifically, looking at where the errors occurred, J48
and NB classified most of this category as “segregated”. Similar to “deleted” responses,
J48, NB and RF had relatively low recall values for “not defined” responses and classified
a small percentage of these as “deleted” and “segregated”. In addition, SVM and RF could
not identify “blocked” responses and incorrectly classified these as “segregated”.
For Company 2 (MT), SVM and RF showed the highest accuracy with 87%, whereas
accuracy was 85% for NB, which was the lowest value. For this company, all the classifiers
had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values for the cases of “none” and “name changed”
responses, which were misclassified as “deleted” and “segregated”. Furthermore, J48 had
the lowest recall value for “blocked” responses and misclassified a percentage of these as
“deleted”. SVM, RF and NB also had low recall values for the “deleted” response as small
percentage of these were misclassified as “segregated”.
For Company 3 (SE), the classification accuracy for J48, SVM and RF was 89%, and
for NB was 85%. Similar to Company 2 (MT), all the classifiers could not identify “name
changed” responses and had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values. This category was
misclassified as “none” and “segregated”. In addition, NB had low recall values for “deleted”
and the rest of the classifiers had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values. Furthermore,
J48, SVM and RF misclassified a percentage of “none” responses as “segregated”.
For Company 4 (EP), SVM had the highest classification accuracy with 91% and RF had
the lowest accuracy with 82%. J48 and SVM had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values
for “none” responses, and these were misclassified as “segregated”. In addition, similar to
Companies 2 (MT) and 3 (SE), all classifiers could not identify “name changed” responses
and these were misclassified as “segregated”. Furthermore, SVM and NB had a lower recall
value for “deleted” responses and J48 and RF had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values
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Table 3 Performance of the
classifiers for identifying the
types of response based on
malware—best results are
highlighted in bold
Company name J48 (%) SVM (%) RF (%) NB (%)
Company 1 (DF) 66 52 66 66
Company 2 (MT) 70 70 70 70
Company 3 (SE) 66 66 66 66
Company 4 (EP) 74 74 74 74
Company 5 (MS) 98 98 98 98
for “name changed” responses, which were misclassified as “segregated” and “blocked”. J48
misclassified “recovered” responses as “blocked”.
Finally, for Company 5 (MS), J48, SVM and RF had the highest accuracy value with
93% and NB had the lowest accuracy value with 89%. All the classifiers had 0% precision,
recall and F-measure for “none” and “name changed” responses and misclassified these as
“deleted” and “segregated”. Moreover, all the classifiers had relatively low recall values for
“segregated” responses and misclassified a percentage of these as “deleted”.
5.2 Q2 Results
Table 3 presents the classification performance details of the J48, NB, RF and SVM classifiers
for the five companies for the question “How to predict a response action from the type of
malware involved”. Full results are shown in Tables 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 in Appendix.
For Company 1 (DF), J48, RF and NB had similar accuracy results of 66%, while SVM
had the lowest accuracy of 52%. All classifiers had a 100% precision, recall and F-measure
values for type of response “not defined”. For “deleted” responses, J48, RF and NB had a
high precision, recall and F-measure values, whereas SVM had a recall value of 100% but
low precision and F-measure values. In addition, for “blocked” responses, J48, RF and NB
had high recall values of 100%, while SVM could not identify this type and had 0% precision,
recall and F-measure values. SVM misclassified this type as “deleted”. Furthermore, all the
classifiers failed to identify or classify other types of responses such as “none”, “recovered”,
“segregated” and “name changed” based on the malware code and had 0% precision, recall
and F-measure values as a result. These types were all misclassified as “deleted”.
For Company 2 (MT), all classifiers had similar accuracy of 70%. The classifiers were
able to classify only two types of responses, which were “not defined” and “segregated” and
had 100% recall values for both. However, they failed to identify or classify other types of
response such as “deleted”, “none”, “blocked” and “name changed” and consequently had
0% precision, recall and F-measure values for these responses. These were then wrongly
classified as “segregated”.
For Company 3 (SE), all classifiers had similar accuracy of 66% and recall values of 100%
for two types of responses, which were “not defined” and “blocked”. In addition, all classifiers
had similar precision, recall and F-measure values for the response type “deleted”, although
some percentage of cases of this type were misclassified as “blocked”. Moreover, all the
classifiers failed to identify or classify other types of responses such as “none”, “segregated”
and “name changed” and therefore had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values for these
types. These types were then wrongly classified as “blocked”.
For Company 4 (EP), all classifiers had similar accuracy values of 75% and recall values
of 100% for two responses: “not defined” and “blocked”. In addition, all classifiers had
similar recall values of 80% for “deleted”. However, 20% of “deleted” were misclassified as
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Table 4 Type of response
distribution for the five
companies showing data
imbalance
Type of responses DF MT SE EP MS
Blocked 166 89 411 231 5
Deleted 39 98 172 91 1153
Name Changed 2 2 10 4 2
None 65 3 43 9 4
Segregated 153 288 206 61 201
Not defined 0 153 81 28 326
Recovered 42 0 0 24 10
Table 5 Type of malware
distribution for the five
companies showing data
imbalance
Type of malware DF MT SE EP MS
Email attachment 372 0 117 99 1140
Spyware 93 153 81 27 326
Virus 467 480 725 322 87
Downloaded file 0 0 0 0 149
Web contents 0 0 0 0 5
“blocked”. Furthermore, all the classifiers failed to identify or classify other types of responses
such as “none”, “recovered”, “segregated” and “name changed” and had 0% precision, recall
and F-measure values. These were misclassified as “blocked” and “deleted”.
Company 5 (MS) had the best classification performance in which all classifiers had an
accuracy value of 98%. However, similar to the previous four companies, all the classifiers
failed to identify or classify other types of responses such as “none”, “recovered” and “name
changed” and had 0% precision, recall and F-measure values. These types were classified as
“deleted” and “segregated”. In addition, J48, SVM, RF and NB had recall values of 100%
for two types of responses, “not defined” and “segregated”, and a recall value of 98% for
response type “deleted”.
6 Implications
In this case study, many factors affected the identification and classification process outlined
in Section 4 using machine learning. We discuss here the results of the previous section in
the light of these factors.
The overall results for the identification of different types of responses based on the given
malicious code indicated that SVM was the best classifier for all the five companies in
terms of performance and accuracy. In addition, most classifiers could not identify response
categories such as “none”, “blocked” and “deleted”. The results for the identification of the
different types of responses based on the given malware showed that all classifiers were
suitable for some types of responses, but they were still unable to identify or classify every
response types. The poor performance from the classifiers was due to the fact that some types
of malware were assigned by companies to multiple response types (e.g “segregated” and
“name changed” were assigned to malware type “virus”) and the high and low frequency
of some types affected the classification due to the imbalance of the categories. This data
imbalance problem is clearly visible from the data distributions of Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 6 Average performance of
the four classifiers used for both
questions
Research questions J48 (%) SVM (%) RF NB
Question 1 87.4 89.4 87 % 86 %
Question 2 74.8 72 74.8 74.8
We can summarise the above observations by the following points:
(1) The classification accuracy was affected by the imbalance of the data set categories as
shown in Tables 4 and 5.
(2) The performance of the classifiers was affected by the multi-labelling of some of the data
categories.
(3) The inconsistency of the categories used across the five companies (e.g types of responses
and malware), as shown in Tables 4 and 5, made the evaluation task difficult.
(4) Our results showed that SVM is more suitable for the detection of types of response using
malicious code, whereas J48, RF and NB are more suitable for the detection of types of
response using malware.
Table 6 shows the average performance of the classifiers against the two questions con-
sidered in the study. It is clear from this table that Q2 was the more difficult question to
predict the answer for, hence the low performance of the classifiers.
7 An experience-sharingmodel
In this section, we define an experience-sharing model that builds on the scenario of Sect. 3 and
uses the results we obtained in Sect. 5 to demonstrate, in principle, how experience sharing can
be implemented across organisations based on data prediction. The main motivation behind
such experience sharing is to improve the ability of an organisation to predict features related
to future incidents, e.g. in our case, improve the ability to answer the questions of Sect. 4.
We define experience sharing as the sharing of an instance of a classification algorithm that
has been trained using data belonging to some company. Sharing implies sending a classifier,
which we term the internal classifier, and possibly receiving either the other company’s
classifier, termed the external classifier, or receiving some form of reward in exchange for
sending the internal one. We do not consider here decisions related to the sending of a
classifier instance, since this is determined by the quality of what is received. Therefore, we
only focus on decisions related to the receiving of the other company’s classifier, where such
external classifiers are compared in their quality to the internal ones to determine whether
they are acceptable from the receiving company’s point of view. Since the assumption is
that we compare the like-for-like in terms of the algorithms used, the difference will purely
reflect the quality of the experience of either company as expressed by its local data set. For
simplicity, we leave out of the scope of this model other administrative factors, such as the
policy or contract governing the sharing process, where we consider these in future (richer)
versions of this model.
Assuming C is the set of all classification algorithms being considered across organisations,
where in our case C = {J48, SVM, RF, NB}, and Q is the set of questions an organisation
aims to answer, here Q = {Q1, Q2}, then we define a classifier-receiving decision function,
ζ : C × C × Q → B, as a predicate:
ζ(cint, cext, q) =
{
if (accuracy(cext, q) − accuracy(cint, q)) <  then F
otherwise T
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Fig. 3 The process of experience sharing between two companies
where cint ∈ C is the internally trained classifier, cext ∈ C is the externally trained classifier,
which the organisation is considering to import, and q ∈ Q is the question the company is
attempting to predict the answer for. The purpose of this decision function is to determine
whether a classifier should be received (True–T) or not (False–F). In this case, we have
restricted the decision function to the comparison of the classifier accuracy only. The function
would return false (F), if the difference in the accuracy between the externally and the
internally trained classifiers was less than some predefined threshold percentage value, %.
This means that the decision is not to receive the external classifier, as it will be of no use to the
company since its accuracy in predicting the answer to the question is lower than the accuracy
of the internally trained classifier. Note again here that we are assuming that the algorithm (e.g.
J48, SVM, etc.) underlying both classifier instances is the same. Otherwise, if the external
classifier exceeds % percentage difference with the internal classifier, the decision will be
true (T), i.e. to receive the external classifier. As noted earlier, it is straightforward to change
the function such that it compares based on any other metric.
Figure 3 shows how the process of experience sharing would work between two companies
using the decision function, ζ .
Example. Let us consider an example of how the above decision function can be used.
Assume Companies 1 (DF) and 5 (MS) would like to share their knowledge of answering
Q1. In this case, both would select SVM as their best classifier. The sharing process from both
companies’ points of view would result in these two calculation of the ζ function, assuming
that DF = 5% and MS = 2%:
ζDF(SVMDF, SVMMS, Q1)
= if (accuracy(SVMMS, Q1) − accuracy(SVMDF,Q1)) < 5% then F otherwise T
= if (93% − 87%) < 5% then F otherwise T = T
ζMS(SVMMS, SVMDF, Q1)
= if (accuracy(SVMDF, Q1) − accuracy(SVMMS, Q1)) < 2% then F otherwise T
= if (87% − 93%) < 2% then F otherwise T = F
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In the above example, we see that company DF has an incentive to accept company MS’s
classifier as it improves on its own classification accuracy. On the other hand, company MS
has no incentive to accept company DF’s classifier as the latter does not improve upon MS’s
classification accuracy. As in other cases, the value of  will determine what the outcome of
the decision function is. Setting , in a real-world case, would require an internal study by
the organisation. We consider this as one possible future research work.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the results of a case study on analysing a Cyber security incidents
community data set for five Korean SMEs. Our analysis framework was designed and imple-
mented to answer two kinds of problems: (1) the prediction of response actions to future
Cyber security incidents involving malware or malicious code, and (2) the utilisation of the
knowledge of the response actions in guiding analyses to determine the type of malware
or the name of the malicious code. Furthermore, text mining methods such as n-gram and
bag-of-words were used to extract relevant features from the data set, and then we applied
machine learning algorithms for the classification process. The experimental results showed
good performance for the classifiers in predicating different types of response and malware.
An initial model of how experience can be shared among companies was also defined based
on the given scenario.
As future work, we aim to investigate whether other questions may be answerable within
the scope of the features offered by the data set. We also plan to expand the analysis to other
data sets in order to investigate the impact of handling the problem of class imbalance on the
classification performance and accuracy. Finally, we aim to formalise a more comprehensive
model for the sharing of text and data classifiers as a means of sharing experience across organ-
isations. Such a model would allow organisations to “trade” their trained classifiers using,
for example, a smart contract specifically designed for this purpose. Using the blockchain
technology, for example, one could envisage a scenario where successful predictions are
rewarded, whereas unsuccessful ones are penalised, therefore leading to a fairer trade model.
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Appendix: detailed performance results
The following tables present the detailed performance results for each case. P represents
precision, R represents recall and F represents the F-measure. For simplicity, we keep these
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metrics as ratios, whereas we present accuracy as a percentage in-line with the summary
results presented in Tables 2 and 3.
See Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
Table 7 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on the malicious
code for Company 1 (DF)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy 83% 87% 82% 84%
Class P R F P R F P R F P R F
None 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97
Recovered 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Segregated 0.73 0.98 0.84 0.75 0.98 0.85 0.64 1.00 0.78 0.75 0.98 0.85
Deleted 0.24 0.14 0.18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.14 0.18
Not defined 1.00 0.69 0.82 0.89 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.69 0.82 1.00 0.74 0.85
Blocked 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 8 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on the malicious
code for Company 2 (MT)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 86% 87% 87% 85%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.86 0.90
Deleted 0.62 0.92 0.79 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.50 0.78 0.61
Not defined 1.00 0.84 0.92 1.00 0.84 0.92 1.00 0.84 0.92 1.00 0.84 0.92
Blocked 1.00 0.61 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 9 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on the malicious
code for Company 3 (SE)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 89% 89% 89% 85%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
None 0.69 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.61 0.65 0.47 0.85 0.61
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.83
Deleted 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.32 0.38
Not defined 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97
Blocked 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 10 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on the malicious
code for Company 4 (EP)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 86% 91% 84% 87%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.11
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.73 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.69 0.71
Deleted 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.48
Not defined 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.97
Blocked 0.87 1.00 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.91 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.00 0.97
Recovered 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.78 1.00 0.88
Table 11 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on the malicious
code for Company 5 (MS)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 93% 93% 93% 89%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.99 0.76 0.86 0.99 0.76 0.86 0.99 0.76 0.86 0.99 0.76 0.86
Deleted 0.88 1.00 0.93 0.88 1.00 0.93 0.88 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.88
Not defined 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.85 0.98 0.91
Table 12 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on malware for
Company 1 (DF)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 66% 52% 66% 66%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
Deleted 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.64 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.93
Not defined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Blocked 0.35 1.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.52 0.35 1.00 0.52
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recovered 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 13 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on malware for
Company 2 (MT)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 70% 70% 70% 70%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
Deleted 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Not defined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Blocked 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.60 1.00 0.75 0.60 1.00 0.75 0.60 1.00 0.75 0.60 1.00 0.75
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 14 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on malware for
Company 3 (SE)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 66% 66% 66% 66%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
Deleted 1.00 0.68 0.81 1.00 0.68 0.81 1.00 0.68 0.81 1.00 0.68 0.81
Not defined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Blocked 0.57 1.00 0.72 0.57 1.00 0.72 0.57 1.00 0.72 0.57 1.00 0.72
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 15 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on malware for
Company 4 (EP)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 74% 74% 74% 74%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
Deleted 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.78
Not defined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Blocked 0.71 1.00 0.83 0.71 1.00 0.83 0.71 1.00 0.83 0.71 1.00 0.83
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recovered 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 16 Performance of the classifiers in identifying the different types of response based on malware for
Company 5 (MS)
J48 SV M RF N B
Accuracy: 98% 98% 98% 98%
Class: P R F P R F P R F P R F
Deleted 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
Not defined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recovered 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.87 1.00 0.93 0.87 1.00 0.93 0.87 1.00 0.93 0.87 1.00 0.93
Name changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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